I "Gold is where you find it," said the old prospector. It has long been recognized, in one way or another, that it belongs to him who can find it and extract it, and that the rules of land tenure and use formed in an agrarian society would serve poorly to define legal rights. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the demand for gold was particularly high. Its vital significance to American economic growth is revealed in the fact that the chronic foreign trade deficit of the United States in these years was balanced by two main elements: capital imports and gold exports.
The Comstock Lode was the first large-scale, deep-vein mining operation in the West, and as a result, the legal practices and mining technology used there were influential in other mining regions. Most significant was the incorporation of Comstock mineral law into the Federal Mining Statutes of 1866 and 1872, which still govern the assignment of private rights to metals on the public domain.5 This article analyzes in detail the mining camp rules that were adopted to allocate the mineral ground and the actions of the Nevada Territorial and State Legislatures and Courts in supplementing those rules. Finally, the paper offers some tentative conclusions regarding the investment response of mine companies to legal support of their claims. Throughout the analysis the focus is on the desire of mine owners to use legal institutions to protect their claims.6
MINERAL RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE COMSTOCK DISCOVERY
Until the Mining Act of 1866, there was no provision for private exploration and ownership of mineral lands on large sections of the public domain. As a result, the prospectors who followed the gold rushes after 1848 were technically trespassing, though there Focusing on the incentive of mine owners to obtain legal support of their claims places considerable emphasis on the effects of economic variables in forcing adjustment in mineral rights arrangements.
This approach seems appropriate given the high expected returns from controlling the land and the lack of an existing ownership structure when ore was first discovered.
There also was general support in Nevada for secure mineral rights.
Economic growth and increases in mine output were highly regarded by Nevada citizens.
For similar findings elsewhere see Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth, x-xiii, 42, 157, 172, 240, 264; Gerald Nash, State Government and Economic Growth, 36-40, 350. Political and social factors, however, were likely to be important in influencing the selection of particular institutions as resource values rose. English common law as well as eastern legislative and judicial practices were brought West by migrants and modified as necessary.
Two outstanding examples of those western modifications are the rejection of the riparian water rights doctrine and the establishment of vein ownership in mineral rights arrangements. was little sustained effort by the federal government to enforce its claims. The Congressional policy of separating agricultural and mineral lands and reserving the latter from private ownership had been established as early as the Land Ordinance of 1785, though leasing rights to salt and lead deposits were granted after 1800. Enforcement costs for those leasing arrangements were high, and in 1847 and 1850 Congress opened copper, lead, and iron lands in the Midwest for private ownership. Mineral lands to the west, however, were unaffected by the legislation. Accordingly, ownership rights were granted to individuals, not by federal statute, but by local mining district rules.7
Until 1859 the rules regarding the allocation of mining land in western Nevada were merely verbal agreements among the one hundred or so miners who prospected just east of Lake Tahoe. That informal arrangement changed suddenly with the discovery in January 1859 of the Comstock Lode, an exposed ribbon of orebearing quartz that ran with other parallel veins in a mineralized zone five miles long and a mile wide. Individual yields jumped from $5 to $100 per day, and those returns attracted thousands of miners from the shallow, placer gold fields of California, pushing the population to 4,000 by November 1860 and to 20,000 the following year. The scramble for the richest lands led to conflicts among the competing claimants and uncertainty regarding the ability of any individual to maintain control of his claim, and pressure rose for a more precise and enforceable ownership structure. Between 1859 and 1860 the Gold Hill, Virginia City, and Devil's Gate Mining Districts were organized along the Comstock Lode with written rules prescribing claim location and size, conditions for maintaining mining rights, and arbitration procedures. The regulations were implemented and enforced by a claim recorder and an ad hoc miners' court. Only individuals who followed the camp rules were granted locally-recognized possessory rights.s 7Attempts by the military governor of California to enforce a leasing arrangement proved futile as troops deserted for the gold fields. 
MINING CAMP GOVERNMENTS
The Gold Hill Rules, listed in the Appendix, were typical of Comstock rights agreements, and they became the basis for subsequent mineral law. Article I called for the election of permanent, though part-time, enforcement officials to guard against violations, record mineral claims, and to arbitrate disputes. Article IV contained the important property rights provisions. By following the required procedures for marking and recording claim boundaries and working the mine, each claimant was granted a local title (Sections 8 and 9). The recording requirement was designed to reduce ownership conflicts, which took valuable time from mining and made control unclear. By recording, each individual announced and defined his holding, thereby helping to avoid concurrent claims by another party. It also dated his claim -an important provision since ownership was granted on the basis of prior possession (Sections 7, 17, 19).
In spite of these gains, Charles H. Shinn, an early student of mining rules in California and Nevada, pointed out that miners were ambivalent towards recording.9 Since each miner was rarely sure how rich his land was, he was reluctant to commit himself to a particular spot until he had a chance to explore the ledge more fully for ore. When a claim was recorded, miners attempted to make the boundaries vague enough so that they could be floated over adjoining rich ground. For example, when the Union and Princess Company discovered ore, the Yellow Jacket Mining Company, located to the west, broadened its claim and charged that the strike was within its land.1' One would expect, however, that this support for vague boundaries would exist only in the short run when the exact location of rich deposits was unknown. Later, as those locations were revealed, one would expect the lucky owners to push for more precision and enforcement of their claim boundaries. Boundary specifications were determined by the type of mining involved. Placer claims were for control of shallow minerals not associated with any deep vein, and consequently were bound in terms of surface land area (200 square feet, Section 9). Ledge claims were for control of underground ore deposits and were defined in terms of the vein and not the surface land. Individuals were granted 300 feet slices along the ledge's exposed surface, rather than the entire vein (Section 13), and the exterior width of each claim was set by the width of the exposed vein. On this land a miner could place shaft buildings. Below the earth, however, the width was almost unbounded. The miner could follow his slice of the vein (300 feet long) wherever it went, even under the property of others. This was called an extra lateral right, and it became a central element of American mining law. It seems clear that the practice evolved as a means of reducing uncertainty; only staking a claim to the vein itself insured that a miner could extract the ore regardless of where it was located. Had claims been defined in terms of exterior boundaries (tree stumps, stream beds, hillsides) the main portion of the ledge was likely to be missed since the extent and flow of the vein were not observable from the surface. This meant that a miner could engage in extensive and costly tunneling along the vein without the prospect of locating ore which was outside his claim."
Since ore deposits were difficult to locate, miners expected to stake and abandon many claims before striking it rich. This process required that the land be available for continued low cost private appropriation. Accordingly, many of the rules were designed to insure access to the land by preventing concentrated ownership. Verbal sales, which were common in the fluid, early mining days, had become sources of uncertainty and conflict since they were difficult to substantiate and easily contested. Accordingly, one of the first acts of the legislature was to require written contracts for property exchanges. Those contracts were to be witnessed and to contain the exact stipulations of the transfer, which could then be enforced by the state.30 Later sessions of the legislature amended the law by adding more specific requirements for the exchange of with the formula total revenue-profits = total costs in mind, total mine revenue was computed as the sum of ore sales and stock assessments, and profits were considered equal to dividend payments.
Computation of those two values and use of the formula gave total costs. and competition for the richest deposits were the major sources of conflict. Table 1 summarizes both production and court activity for Comstock mines. Analysis of District and Supreme Court records show that except for one case, contention was between the forty mines on the Lode and the adjacent claims off it. The former were by far the region's leading producers, while few parallel claims near the Comstock ever paid. The record suggests that many of those parallel claims were located along paying mines for extortion. As soon as ore was struck within a mine, contestants appeared to dispute ownership, resulting in either litigation or side payments by the mine owner to avoid costly court activity. Comstock mines were particularly vulnerable to such action because of their indefinite side boundaries. By camp law they were granted ownership of a section of the vein and allowed to follow it beneath the earth; yet, underground borders were unclear in the early years, particularly, given the complex geology of the region. The Table shows , however, that not all Comstock mines were involved in legal contests. To determine why some claims were contested while others were not, the production data in Table 1 were regressed against the number of court suits for each mine.40 This test was run under the assumption that as the value of output, profits, claim size, and number of owners increased, conflicts over the claim would rise.
The number of owners for each mine was entered in the regression with a dummy variable whose value was 0 for mines of few owners. The regression results show that both the value of output from 1859-1865 and length of the claim were significant in determining which mines would be involved in mineral rights conflicts.41 The distinguishing factor in whether a productive mine was involved in court action was claim length. The average surface claim length for mines with a record of court suits was 1265 feet, while that for mines with no such record was one fifth as long, or 277 feet. There are several possible reasons for the importance of claim length. One is that shorter, more compact 40 There is no problem of double counting for the court cases listed in Table 1 The Nevada record through 1868, then, is clear regarding legislative and judicial backing for private mining efforts on public land along the Comstock Lode. A question that arises is whether the resulting security attracted additional mining investment.
INVESTMENT REACTION TO CHANGES IN MINING LAW
In an attempt to isolate the investment response to changes in mineral rights law two approaches were followed. One was to examine the behavior of mine stocks on the San Francisco Ex- Because it is difficult to separate the effects of legislation and ore strikes, a clear test of market reaction to the federal law passed on July 23rd, which allowed for private ownership of public mineral lands, is impossible. Statistical tests run for that law and other federal statutes and court rulings proved inconclusive. In summary, then, the index did react sharply to news of ore discoveries, but showed little clear reaction to legal change.
Because there are significant problems in using stock prices to study investment behavior, the test does not rule out an output response to changes in the law, but it and the supporting qualitative evidence suggest that any response was probably small. Prior legal guarantees appear not to have been necessary to attract investors in western mining. Because of the high expected returns and the lack of existing (and perhaps hostile) rights structures, mineral claimants were able to establish the legal institutions necessary to support their private claims. The ability to locate paying ore, however, was a much more difficult task, one which investors followed closely. Most claims, in fact, did not pay. For example, over the period 1859-1882 only seven of the Comstock mines had dividend payments in excess of assessments. Similarly for Colorado, James D. Hague reported in the U.S. Geological Survey that capital was raised easily as early as 1863 in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia well before federal claims were settled. The major problem that existed there was not a legal one, but rather a lack of mining training and experience for extracting and milling the complex Colorado ore.52
In conclusion, while mine owners lobbied for legislative and judicial support of their rights, the primary aim of that activity was to protect existing property rights and not to elicit further investment. Indeed, there seems to have been little investment or output reaction to changes in the legal structure.
CONCLUSION
The Nevada experience demonstrates the nature of legal response to rapid increases in resource values that occurred in the mining West in the nineteenth century. The analysis has focused on the motivation of resource owners to obtain legal definition and supa dummy variable for ore strikes, New York gold prices, and New York short term brokers' rates, which were lagged by one day to allow for San Francisco adjustment (both markets were connected by the telegraph). None of the tests proved conclusive. port of their rights in face of intense competition for control of the land. That need resulted in the establishment of a series of institutions that assigned and guaranteed private mineral rights: the mining camps in 1859, the territorial government in 1861, the state government in 1864, and the federal mining law of 1866. Examination of specific statutes and court rulings show that most mineral rights laws were aimed at reducing ownership uncertainty, and over time a secure mineral rights structure emerged that facilitated the operation of one of the country's foremost mining regions, which eventually produced $400,000,000 in gold and silver. The Nevada record, then, is similar to that reported by Willard Hurst for Wisconsin, Gerald Nash for California, and Harry Scheiber for Ohio -in the nineteenth century government involvement in the economy was largely aimed at supporting private investment and economic growth.
APPENDIX Gold Hill Mining District, Nevada Rules and Regulations

Preamble
Whereas, the isolated position we occupy far from all legal tribunals and cut off from those fountains of justice which every American citizen should enjoy, renders it necessary that we organize in body politic for our mutual protection against the lawless, and for meting out justice between man and man; therefore, we, citizens of Gold Hill, do hereby agree to adopt the following rules and laws for our government:
Rules and Regulations ARTICLE 1. There shall be elected one Justice of the Peace, one Constable, and one Recorder of this district for the term of six months. ARTICLE 4. The duty of the Recorder shall be to keep in a well-bound book a record of all claims which may be presented for record, with the names of the parties locating or purchasing, the number of feet, where situated, and the date of location or purchase; also to return a certificate for such claim or claims. 
